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The Human Cost of PREVENT: A Systematic Literature Review of the UK's Counter-Radicalisation Policy

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Abstract

As more contemporary acts of terror have reached global news, the phenomenon has placed counter-terrorism at the forefront of academia and politics. Over time the conversation has shifted to preventing radicalisation domestically. Academia's increased focus has led to a murky, confusing landscape for future researchers to navigate, specifically concerning the effectiveness of policies. This systematic literature review aims to shed clarity on this area of research. Collating, exploring, and analysing current literature, the study asks what the overall evaluation of PREVENT is and the human cost of this policy within the Education sector.

To gather the literature for this review, the 'building block' method was used initially; at this stage, responses were limited to the first five pages and by date (2008- Present). This collection of literature was then complemented by the 'snowballing' method. Responses were limited to the first five pages. Analyses of the literature demonstrated that PREVENT is ineffective and contributes significantly to the themes it aims to combat. On this basis, it is recommended that the policy is abandoned in favour of a policy that promotes inclusion. Further research is needed to identify other impacts of PREVENT and best practice worldwide to ensure that future policies are effective.

Table of Contents

<u>CHAPTER 1 – Introduction</u>	1
<u>1.1 Introduction</u>	1
<u>1.2 Defining Radicalisation</u>	2
<u>1.3 Wider European Applications of Counter Radicalisation Policies</u>	6
<u>1.4 Introduction and Summary of PREVENT</u>	8
<u>CHAPTER 2 – Methodology</u>	11
<u>2.1 Introduction</u>	11
<u>2.2 Operationalisation</u>	12
<u>2.3 Search Strategy</u>	13
<u>2.4 Search parameters</u>	14
<u>2.4.1 Search parameters for Sub-question 1</u>	14
<u>2.4.2 Search parameters for Sub-question 2</u>	15
<u>2.4.3 Search parameters for Sub-question 3</u>	15
<u>2.4.4 Search process summary</u>	15
<u>2.4.5 Noted articles</u>	16
<u>Chapter 3 – Review of the Literature</u>	17
<u>3.1 Evaluation of PREVENT</u>	17
<u>3.1.1 Statutory Duty</u>	18
<u>3.1.2 Reframing of Relationships</u>	19
<u>3.1.3 Islamophobia</u>	20
<u>3.1.4 Summary</u>	21
<u>3.2 PREVENT’s Effect on Pedagogical Staff</u>	22
<u>3.2.1 Redefining and Limiting of Role</u>	22
<u>3.2.2 Infringement of Safe Spaces</u>	23
<u>3.2.3 Islamophobia</u>	24
<u>3.2.4 Summary</u>	25
<u>3.3 PREVENT’s Effect on Students Across the UK’s Education System</u>	26
<u>3.3.1 Islamophobia</u>	26
<u>3.3.2 Securitised Freedom</u>	28
<u>3.3.3 Climate of Distrust</u>	29
<u>3.3.4 Summary</u>	29
<u>3.4 Discussion and Conclusions</u>	30
<u>CHAPTER 4 – Conclusion</u>	32
<u>Bibliography</u>	35
<u>Appendices</u>	42
<u>Appendix A. Documentation of search process</u>	42

CHAPTER 1 – Introduction

1.1 Introduction

2021 will mark the 20th anniversary of 9/11, a point of such unprecedented catastrophe that it arguably defined the earliest part of this century. This is evident in how the after-effects continue to be felt, from baggage screening (Blalock et al. 2007) to an increase in anti-immigrant and anti-foreigner sentiments (Schüller 2016). The unprecedented level of loss was reported worldwide, cementing the atrocity in the global psyche. As the pictures emerged from "America's darkest day" (Abadi 2020), countries across the world put together ministerial steering committees and task forces and strengthened security measures (Van de Linde et al. 2002).

The sudden concentrated focus on terrorism and how governments could prevent it led to an over-saturated, disorganised nebulous of literature and policies. As time has gone on, the chaotic nature of the literature has only worsened. To begin to form effective policies and recommendations, the field of counter-terrorism needs to concentrate its aims on collating the knowledge gathered so far and making sense of it. Summaries and universal definitions will aid academics and policymakers alike to move towards this goal.

As more contemporary acts of terror have reached global news, like the bombings in Madrid 2004 and London 2005 (Kundnani 2012), perspectives on how to prevent terrorism have altered in focus. As terrorists are increasingly becoming radicalised domestically, counter-terrorism policies have shifted to focusing on preventing radicalisation at home (Intelligence and Security Committee 2006; Ragazzi 2017). This caused an unparalleled merging of social and security policies (Abbas 2005; Husband and Alam 2011; Klausen 2009; Pickering et al. 2008; Spalek and Lambert 2008) and gave rise to strategies like the UK's PREVENT.

The PREVENT strategy is considered widely controversial due to it marking "an increased foregrounding of security over welfare" (Ragazzi 2017:164) and because of the suggestion that it "leads in practice to a sense of exclusion and isolation" (Sabir 2017:205). Here at this

nexus of counter-radicalisation and education, this systematic literature review aims to shed clarity. The education system and counter-radicalisation ideologies exist alongside each other, laboured with contrasting ideas of safeguarding and conflicting ideals of welfare (Open Justice Initiative 2016).

Although there are arguably many differences between the two systems, both have similar goals when reduced to their simplest purposes. The education system arguably exists with the sole function of bettering the lives of the children in its care, and it is here that compassionate ideologies of counter-radicalisation can meet pedagogy and support it.

Children's welfare, especially when considering those who are the most vulnerable, should be the main focus of any policies that affect them. This systematic literature review will provide intelligibility to an otherwise excessively vague chaos surrounding the UK's PREVENT policy. This will enable future academics and policymakers to form effective policies and better protect the children entrusted to the education system.

1.2 Defining Radicalisation

The centralisation of radicalisation in recent counter-terrorism discussion came after a series of terror attacks in major European cities (Madrid 2004 and London 2005) where several of the perpetrators originated from within the target country (Kundnani 2012: 3). The two atrocities caused an increase in pressure for policymakers to do more to "understand radicalisation" so that "effective" action could be taken by authorities to prevent further attacks (Intelligence and Security Committee 2006:29).

To fully understand radicalisation and the possible solutions, it was imperative for academics and policymakers to move past the generic definition in the public sphere. This definition is best exemplified by the Oxford Dictionary's classification of radicalisation as "the action or process of causing someone to adopt radical positions on political or social issues" (Oxford University Press n.d.). In attempts to further quantify and facilitate understanding, academics have devised different definitions for radicalisation, with varying

degrees of success. The resulting myriad of definitions makes it almost impossible to facilitate easy and accurate comparison across research or data sets.

Academic attempts to define radicalisation vary from excessively vague, perhaps best illustrated by the difference between Paul Neuman's description of radicalisation as "what goes on before the bomb goes off" (Quoted in Schmid 2013:6) to detailed and applicable. Many, however, fall in the vast gap between the two. The 2006 definition from the European Commission where radicalisation is defined as the "phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism" is an example of this gap (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009:6). This definition moves past the Oxford Dictionary's and Paul Neuman's descriptions but still fails to quantify or specify radicalisation and its relation to terrorism. The ambiguity surrounding the definitions above and the chasm between them is emblematic of the lack of official consensus and adds to the current failure to "address the complexity" of radicalisation (Schmid 2013:12).

Ambiguity is further reflected in the UK government's definition of radicalisation. It defines radicalisation as the "process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups" (UK Government 2015:36). The lack of expansion surrounding what counts as 'extremist ideologies' causes this definition to be unsuitable for generalising information and reports. The previous definitions leave much unsaid and, therefore they are unsuitable for a field-wide definition.

The lack of a current universal definition of radicalisation only serves "to blur the counterterrorist response" (Richards, 2011: 145). As a means to address this gap in the literature, this review is recommending Alex Schmid's proposed definition from their literature review of radicalisation (2013). He defines it as:

"an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either (I) the use of (non-

violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes. The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by ideological socialisation away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilisation outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognised as appropriate or legitimate." (Schmid, 2013:18)

This definition solves a variety of the issues that the previous ones present. As such, this is the chosen definition for this systematic literature review and the recommended definition for future studies.

One of the critical strengths of Schmid's definition is that it clearly states that radicalisation is a process; understanding this process and the forms it takes is imperative to any counter-radicalisation method. One of the key models of radicalisation is the conical one suggested by Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004), pictured below.




Fig. 1 – Wiktorowicz’s Model for Joining Extremist and Terrorist Groups (referenced in Beutel 2009:9)

Wiktorowicz introduced the concept of a “cognitive opening”. A cognitive opening is a moment where an individual faces a personal crisis so extreme it “shakes certainty in previously accepted beliefs and renders an individual more receptive to the possibility of alternative views and perspectives” (Wiktorowicz, 2004:7). This cognitive opening is then filled by ideology, that through socialisation, results in the individual or group mobilising.

As technology and globalisation has advanced, these individualistic processes have been impacted by access to the internet (Von Behr et al. 2013:xii). The internet has many advantages for members mobilising to radicalise at-risk individuals. This is due to the internet's relatively low cost, general ease of access, anonymity and global access (UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task 2008:14). This easily accessible tool drastically helps disseminate radical messaging and facilitates the strengthening of existing beliefs (Von Behr et al. 2013:xii).

The accessibility of the internet mentioned above, combined with the pre-existing complexity of radicalisation, means that any counter-radicalisation policies and programmes must be equally versatile. The requirement for versatility leads to multi-sector approaches and definitions, illustrated in the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force's (UN CTITF) definition. UN CTITF defines counter-radicalisation as:

"Policies and programmes aimed at addressing some of the conditions that may propel some individuals down the path to terrorism. It is used broadly to refer to a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalised) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists" (Quoted in Schmid 2013:50).

The deliberate emphasis on the "package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programmes" (Quoted in Schmid 2013:50) sets the tone for the majority of counter-radicalisation policies. It is a combination of outreach programmes and policies across the sectors that is symptomatic of successful counter-radicalisation policies, something the next section will demonstrate. The next portion of this review will briefly

explore two European contemporaries to the UK's PREVENT programme to provide further context and explain the importance of cross-sector work.

1.3 Wider European Applications of Counter Radicalisation Policies

Using the previously discussed definitions and Wiktorowicz's model, the following section will briefly explore the broader European context to the UK's PREVENT program to more firmly situate the program within the complex field of counter-radicalisation policies. The focus of many counter-radicalisation policies stems from countries' experience with terrorism instead of what Rapoport would refer to as the 'fourth wave of terrorism' (Rapoport 2002: The Waves section para.1). An example of this would be Sweden's Exit program, formed in 1988, designed to primarily address members of groups with far-right wing ideologies (Daugherty 2019) instead of what Rapoport considers the current 'Religious wave' (Rapoport 2002: The Waves section para.1).

Organisations in Sweden like the Bevara Sverige Svenskt (Keep Sweden Swedish) group and Nordiska rikspartiet (NRP) form part of a relatively unique type of terrorist organisation (Mattsson and Johansson 2018). This is due to the long lifespan of such groups. Daugherty suggests that this is because members consider the groups as "socially attractive" and providing "economic opportunities within" (2019:239). Consequently, this attracts better educated and less socially isolated individuals than seen elsewhere and prolongs the time that members stay as part of the organisations. Sweden's Exit program, therefore, set out to tackle the practical, social, and emotional needs of the individuals that refer themselves to the program (Tillie et al. 2008). The staff meets these needs by following a 5-stage process designed to "walk an individual through the entire disengagement and deradicalisation process" (Daugherty 2019:243).

The ideology of individuals is avoided by staff members as many groups "school" (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 1998 quoted in Daugherty 2019:244) their members with counter-arguments for any deradicalisation attempts. This renders any counter-ideology approach "futile" and puts the individual into "defensive mode" (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 1998

quoted in Daugherty 2019:244). Instead, the staff focus on providing support to assist in self deradicalisation. In 2001 The Swedish Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) evaluated the program and found that 125 of the 133 that had passed through the program had disengaged from far-right extremist organisations and were thus considered a success (Disley et al., 2011). In 2008 Exit Sweden published an analysis of the last ten years, and out of the 600 individuals the program had served, only two were known as having returned to far-right movements (Bjørgero et al. 2009). Swedish Exit program staff do not discuss ideology with clients due to the likelihood of prolonged exposure to extremist rhetoric (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 1998 quoted in Daugherty 2019:244). This avoidance of ideology and countering it, whilst reportedly successful, runs in direct contrast to several other European counter-radicalisation policies.

Countering ideology and preventing extremist ideologies is central to policies like Finland's National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation (Davies and Limbada 2019) and Germany's 'Federal Government Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy' program. Germany's policy aims to "fight the causes of terrorism and extremism by thwarting the radicalisation process" (Butt and Tuck 2014:20) through education and implementation of activities at the local authority, regional and federal levels (Davies and Limbada 2019). The policy is split into two main subsections at the federal level: "Live Democracy! Active against Right-wing Extremism, Violence and Hate" and "Cohesion through participation" (German Federal Government, 2017).

The policy is then actioned at the various levels of government through "sustainable structures" (German Federal Government, 2017). Germany's Federal Strategy does this through the use of civic education to reinforce fundamental liberal democratic values. In recent years their counter-radicalisation educational concepts have been developed to address racism, Islamophobia, Islamist extremism and left-wing extremism (Davies and Limbada 2019).

An interesting aspect of Germany's policy is that it addresses radicalisation beyond just extremism that translates directly into violent behaviour, any thinking that constitutes anti-democratic is considered extremist. This allows the policy to be more flexible in preventing

individuals from becoming radicalised and reducing the chance of a cognitive opening (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

Germany's focus on extremist ideologies and preventing them from occurring instead of de-radicalising individuals later down the line shows a similar approach to the UK's PREVENT program.

1.4 Introduction and Summary of PREVENT

In the aftermath of the Madrid 2004 and London 2005 attacks, policymakers pushed forward the notion "that more need[ed] to be done to understand radicalisation" so that the state and communities could take "effective" action to prevent terrorism (Intelligence and Security Committee 2006:29). The unprecedented focus on domestic radicalisation caused a merging of social and security policies (Abbas 2005; Husband and Alam 2011; Klausen 2009; Pickering et al. 2008; Spalek and Lambert 2008). This policy merge gave rise to counter-radicalisation strategies across the world that emphasised countering ideology and "an increased foregrounding of security over welfare" (Ragazzi 2017:164). One of the most controversial being the UK's PREVENT policy.

PREVENT forms part of the Contest II strategy re-established in 2008-2009 as a revision of the original 2003 Contest strategy. Contest II in its infancy (2008-2010 under the Labour Government) emphasised: "social programmes aimed at reinforcing community cohesion" (Ragazzi 2017:165). In 2010 the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition was voted into power. This Coalition viewed the Labour government's social programmes as "ineffectual and a waste of resources" (Ragazzi 2017:166) and consequently replaced them with strategies more closely aligned with countering radical rhetoric and ideologies.

Under both leaderships discussed above and the ones that have followed, the Contest II strategy has been based on four pillars: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. Each Pillar targets its specified section of counter-terrorism protocols. Prevent is aimed at countering radicalisation, Pursue focuses on active terrorist plots, Protect on building critical security

infrastructure and Prepare on increasing the ‘resilience’ of the general public (UK Government 2011). The four pillars can be seen simplified in figure 2 below. This systematic literature review will focus solely on the PREVENT branch of the Contest II strategy.




Fig. 2 – CONTEST’s Risk Reduction Model (UK Government 2018:27)

As a policy, PREVENT focuses on three objectives: “respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism ..., prevent people from being drawn into terrorism ... and work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation” (UK Government 2011:17). The original conception of the program PREVENT was coordinated by the Office for Security and Counterterrorism branch of the Home office. During the Labour government, the enforcement of the policy was delegated to local authorities and community groups like youth offending teams, voluntary groups, and educational and health services (Home Office 2011).

In 2007 the Office for Security and Counterterrorism introduced the 'Channel' programme to run alongside any locally implemented schemes. Channel is described as being focused on "providing support at an early stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism" (Department of Education 2015:6). The multi-agency approach to counter-radicalisation works by identifying those at risk, assessing the level of risk posed and then developing a plan to support the individual to disengage (HM Government 2015). Under its original design, Channel was a purely voluntary system for people working in education and childcare, health and social care and beyond to report individuals suspected of becoming radicalised. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 shifted reporting individuals through Channel to a statutory duty for anyone working in various public sectors (Ragazzi 2017).

Since conception, the Contest II strategy has drawn serious reservations from critics. The original Labour version drew criticism due to the heavy emphasis on communities being both the cause and solution to radicalisation. The social programmes put in place were considered to rely too much on communities solving 'community issues', leading to the implication that terrorism and radicalisation were a unique phenomenon within the 'Muslim community' (Spalek, 2012). Academics who have evaluated the policy have suggested that the "policies pursued under the PREVENT strategy have discriminated against Muslim Minority Groups, reproduced divisions between the police and targeted communities and damaged community relations" (Kundani 2009; Mythen et al. 2017:183). This reproduction of "divisions" can be linked back to Wiktorowicz's model of radicalisation (Wiktorowicz, 2004) and the idea that external conditions can lead to personal uncertainty that makes individuals and groups vulnerable to radicalisation. Jarvis and Lister (2012) echoed this link between division and increased vulnerability in their evaluation of the policy. They argued that the use of professionals within sectors like education and childcare and health and social care exacerbated differentiation and discrimination, at the cost of undermining the trust between a now vulnerable community and those there to help them (Jarvis and Lister 2012).

The Conservative-Liberal Democrat iteration of the Contest II strategy has also drawn intense criticism. The emphasis that this phase of the policy placed on ideology and

countering it at all levels only served to further the division caused by the Labour strategy. Academics like Rizwaan Sabir argue that the use of 'strategic communications' and surveillance "leads in practice to a sense of exclusion and isolation" of Muslim communities (Sabir 2017:205). The statutory duty created by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 has also drawn condemnation from across the board. Primarily for "the targeting of "pre-criminality", "non-violent extremism", and opposition to "British values"" (Open Justice Initiative, 2016: 4). There is also the juxtaposing duties of safeguarding (especially within the education sector), i.e., protecting the vulnerable and reporting them.

Whilst it is clear to see the theoretical background to the PREVENT policy in both iterations of the Contest II strategy, it also arguably has a vast range of severely damaging unintended impacts within both target communities and broader society. The following chapters of this investigation will focus on unravelling the nebulous literature surrounding the strategy to make future recommendations and study within the field easier to develop and apply to real problems.

CHAPTER 2 – Methodology

The following sections in this chapter will present, in aggregated parts, how the research questions were operationalised and how the search strategy was developed. For this dissertation, 'literature review' will refer to the stand-alone type only. Stand-alone literature reviews attempt to understand and explain a body of existing literature by separating it into smaller sections, interpreting the literature and then explaining or integrating the existing research (Rousseau, Manning, and Denyer 2008).

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this systematic literature review is to explore and collate academic responses to the UK's PREVENT programme, allowing for a firm base to be formed for future

study and policies. In order to best achieve this firm base, this review will follow the descriptive review model. Xiao and Watson explain descriptive models as examining “the state of the literature as it pertains to a specific research question, topical area, or concept” (2019:95). In line with this, this study will seek to explore and summarise the literature surrounding PREVENT. This interrogation of the literature will provide future researchers and academics with a greater understanding of the field to date, allowing for more informed policy decisions and academic recommendations.

2.2 Operationalisation

For this review to be successful in providing a concrete foundation for further academic study, the focus needed to be narrowed from PREVENT in general to specific areas. To achieve this, a series of sub-questions were operationalised.

As previously discussed, radicalisation is thought to occur due to individuals seeking radical ideologies to fill cognitive openings (Wiktorowicz, 2004). Inclusive education helps fill this opening, reducing the rest of the radicalisation process's risks. Therefore, this study must help illustrate clearly both the current effectiveness of PREVENT and the implications of the programme within education.

To ensure that this systematic literature review succeeds in this goal, the following sub-questions were designed.

- Sub-question 1 pertains to the success of PREVENT overall. To explore this area of interest, the review will focus on various academic sources to form a field-wide conclusion. It is believed that a wide range of sources from different journals and authorships will provide a broad enough scope to highlight any areas for improvement within the programme.
- Sub-question 2 regards the impact of PREVENT on staff within education. This is to be investigated by assessing findings from a myriad of sources and the subsequent application of theoretical knowledge.

- Sub-question 3 followed a similar operationalisation to sub-question 2. However, this sub-question focuses on the impact PREVENT has on students across the UK's education system. Again, this question will be investigated via the study of various articles and papers on the topic and the following application of theories.

To ensure that each question's answers and significant implications are as unbiased as possible, the sources used to evaluate them will be drawn from the entire lifespan of Contest II to date. This will ensure that any suggestions in later parts of the review are pertinent to helping address Wiktorowicz's concept of a cognitive opening (2004) in a real-world setting through the educational application of PREVENT.

2.3 Search Strategy

In order to develop an effective search strategy, the process set out by Xiao and Watson (2019) was used as the primary framework. The three-stage method presents a valuable framework for conducting a systematic literature review and guiding researchers through the stages of planning, conducting and reporting the review. To enable readers to grasp the process and the steps involved quickly, a copy of the plan has been included in figure 3 below.




Fig. 3 – Process of systematic literature review (Xiao and Watson 2019:103)

To effectively complete Step 3 (shown in figure 3), Xiao and Watson’s process was complemented by methods detailed by Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VUA 2021). At the beginning of the literature search, it was imperative to find as much relevant material as possible. To do this Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam’s ‘building block’ method was applied (2021). This method uses a selected range of search terms for each sub-question to find suitable sources. This stage was then followed up by the 'snowballing' method (VUA 2021). ‘Snowballing’ means that one article can be used as a base from which to find older or new literature on the same subject (VUA 2021). The decision was taken to combine Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam's methods and Xiao and Watson's process to combat any subjectivity issues due to a single researcher and ensure that as much relevant literature was discovered as possible.

2.4 Search parameters

In the following sections, the search parameters for each of the three sub-questions will be detailed to assist in replication and testing. Two databases have been used to ensure a wide range of literature has been sampled for review. Here the terms used in the 'building block' stage (VUA 2021) of the search are referred to as ‘concept domains’ for ease.

2.4.1 Search parameters for Sub-question 1

Sub-question 1: Is PREVENT considered successful by academics?

DATABASES	CONCEPT DOMAINS	INCLUDED IF	EXCLUDED IF
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Google Scholar • Jstor 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radicalisation • PREVENT • UK 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mentions overall success levels in abstract • Mentions success in education 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Doesn’t discuss the effectiveness of the programme

Table 1. Search parameters for Sub-question 1

2.4.2 Search parameters for Sub-question 2

Sub-question 2: What is the impact of PREVENT on staff within the education sector?

DATABASES	CONCEPT DOMAINS	INCLUDED IF	EXCLUDED IF
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Google Scholar • Jstor 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radicalisation • PREVENT • UK • Education 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mentions levels of success within education • Mentions staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has a specific focus in a non-educational sector, i.e., prisons • Doesn't mention effect on staff

Table 2. Search parameters for Sub-question 2

2.4.3 Search parameters for Sub-question 3

Sub-question 2: What is the impact of PREVENT on students within the education sector?

DATABASES	CONCEPT DOMAINS	INCLUDED IF	EXCLUDED IF
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Google Scholar • Jstor 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radicalisation • PREVENT • UK • Education 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mentions levels of success within education • Mentions students 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has a specific focus in a non-educational sector, i.e., prisons • Doesn't mention effect on students

Table 3. Search parameters for Sub-question 3

2.4.4 Search process summary

To find the literature to interrogate, this review relied on both Google Scholar and Jstor. The combination of the two databases was to ensure that as many relevant articles as possible were obtained. To further ensure the accuracy of the results, the research for each sub-question was conducted separately. All searches were initially limited by date to reduce irrelevant results; the time frame put in place covered 2008 – present, traversing the policy's lifespan. The initial number of searches for each query was then recorded. After

this, the search was refined to the first five pages of both databases (sorted by relevance). Following the 5 page limit, the new results were also recorded.

Each sub-questions' search followed the individual search parameters in the relevant table above (tables 1-3). Following this 'building block' search (VUA 2021), each piece of literature was screened for inclusion. The themes used to determine significance are also detailed clearly in tables 1 to 3. Primarily, the material's relevance was determined by the title alone. If the article seemed to discuss themes relevant to the sub-question in the title, the full reference was obtained (including author, year and title) for further evaluation.

Appendix A shows each search query in both databases and the results.

After reviewing the first five pages on both databases for each search, the articles were then further screened for relevance, this time using the abstract. The articles were then included or excluded using the abstracts, based on whether they met the inclusion/ exclusion criteria for each sub-question. Overall a total of 41 articles were selected across the three sub-questions.

Once selected for inclusion, the articles were read in-depth and themes were drawn out from each and then grouped for ease of discussion later. In this stage of the search process, the 'snowballing' method (VUA 2021) was utilised. As key themes were discovered, any material cited in the literature was then noted for further analysis. All articles documented at this stage then had the inclusion/ exclusion criteria relevant to their sub-question applied. This method ensured that as much literature was included in this systematic review and that any literature included was relevant and significant.

2.4.5 Noted articles

A list of articles noted at all stages is available upon request to the author. Otherwise, please refer to the bibliography for the list of the articles included in this review.

Chapter 3 – Review of the Literature

The following chapter of this review will detail and explore the key themes from the literature, collated in three aggregated sections, concluding with the condemnation of the policy. Initially, it will discuss the findings from the first sub-question, illustrating how successful Prevent is considered to be overall. It will then explore the literature covering the effect on pedagogical staff and students in a further two respective sections.

Through the course of this systematic literature review, it has become clear that whilst many academics have evaluated the policy, there has been little research into the effects within Education. This disparity is reflected in the size and quantity of literature in each of the following three sections. The author hopes that, with the foundation of knowledge that this piece of work provides, future studies can address this gap.

3.1 Evaluation of PREVENT

Having reviewed a broad range of literature, it is clear that not only is PREVENT considered unsuccessful but that it also causes a wide range of negative, unintended impacts within the target communities and beyond. The literature gathered covers a variety of issues, from the policy not having an empirical base (Powel 2016; Hardy 2018; McGlynn and McDaid 2019) to it being another state tool to “defang political protest” (Qato 2017:282). Due to this vast and far-reaching set of critiques, this literature review has selected three main thematic groups of concepts to focus on; PREVENT's statutory duty, reframing relationships, and Islamophobia. As displayed above, there are other avenues of criticism to PREVENT, but the three selected themes were the most common within the literature gathered. As such, the decision was taken to focus on these to provide a stronger sense of clarity.

3.1.1 Statutory Duty

Statutory duty within the policy (also known as the Prevent duty) is defined as organisations having to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and to report those deemed vulnerable” (Danvers 2021:1). This particular aspect of the policy draws strong criticism from a wide range of academics and contributes to the damaging effects on target communities and beyond. This criticism is exemplified best by Dudenhoefer’s description of the Prevent duty as “one of the most problematic parts” of the policy (2018:2). This sentiment is echoed by other academics who offer a range of critiques and insights into this aspect of PREVENT.

The Prevent duty (Spiller et al. 2018:144) draws a host of generalised criticism from across the public sectors. The deputisation of staff into a system of surveillance (Spiller et al. 2018) and the increased concerns of over-reporting issues and undertraining (Mastroe 2016) to a “dangerous” and “counter-productive” environment (Spiller et al. 2018:144). The over-reporting issues mentioned by (Mastroe 2016) can be further explained by staffs' confusion, especially within Education, around how to distinguish between normal, human rebellion and violent radicalisation, as evidenced by Dudenhoefer (2018:2).

Confusion around the Prevent duty and how it applies within a sector is a common theme of criticism. Heath-Kelly and Strausz, for example, highlight within the healthcare sector the Prevent duty's presumption of the lack of adult agency and the blurring of the term ‘vulnerability’ (2019:93). Under PREVENT, ‘vulnerable’ is expanded to cover the entire population, no longer only referring to a state of reduced or diminished capacity (Heath-Kelly and Strausz 2019:93).

The expansion and blurring of the term is seen across the sectors, with Richards arguing that within Education, the use of the term ‘vulnerable’ has become “politically motivated”, allowing for the “scope of risk-assessment [to be] rendered potentially unlimited” (2011:151). This broadened scope arguably allows for the compulsory extension of an “infantilising model of securitised child protection” (McGovern 2016:54), adding to the competing issues and consequential excessive vagueness surrounding the policy.

The confusion for those functioning under the Prevent duty is arguably exacerbated by the 'moral panic' around Islamic fundamentalism (Stevenson 2018). The confusion and moral panic lead to policy implementation that disproportionately targets Muslim communities (Danvers 2021; Guest et al. 2020; Saeed and Johnson 2016; Scott-Baumann 2017). As such, the perceptions of concepts such as 'risk' and vulnerable become distinctly racialised (Danvers 2021; Dudenhoefer 2018) and therefore make the policy ineffective at best and severely damaging at worst.

3.1.2 Reframing of Relationships

The critiques for the policy go beyond the immediate implications of its statutory duty and the accompanying nebulous of terms. The combination of the points mentioned above leads to the scope for PREVENT gradually increasing and becoming distorted through the strategic use of indistinct terms. This scope is enforced through the Prevent duty and causes more areas to become patronisingly "securitised" (McGovern 2016:54). The consequential securitisation, especially within areas like Education, leads to an inescapably limited freedom of expression (Taylor and Soni 2017; Mythen et al. 2017) and the negative reframing of professional relationships (Danvers 2021:2). The following section will explore the literature surrounding and evidencing the above argument, demonstrating the damaging effects of PREVENT.

One of the key areas of contention surrounding PREVENT's effect on professional relations is the concept of "deputising" staff (Spiller et al. 2018:144) into a system that places service users (i.e., students within Education) as the suspects and staff as informants (Danvers 2021; O'Donnell 2016; Qato 2017). McGovern described this shift as representing "a modern day McCarthyite regime of spying and scapegoating" (2016:59). This damning condemnation of staff being used as "thought police" (McGlynn and McDaid 2019:4) is echoed across critiques of PREVENT highlighted in this section, and the effects on target communities and beyond cannot be overstated.

Placing staff as 'police' (McGlynn and McDaid 2019:4) severely undermines the concepts of confidentiality in sectors like Health Care and Education (Ragazzi 2017; Danvers 2021; Qato 2017). Undermining this trust causes suspicion (Qato 2017; Spiller et al. 2018) and leads to freedom of expression being limited out of fear (Spiller et al. 2018; Taylor and Soni 2017).

The culture of fear (Spiller et al. 2018; Qato 2017; O'Donnell 2016) that arises from this prevents the crucial debate that can help shift radical views (Taylor and Soni 2017) and address the cognitive opening described by Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004). To avoid being perceived as radical or guilty, those who come into contact with the policy begin to practice risk-avoidant behaviour (Taylor and Soni 2017; Danvers 2021; Spiller et al. 2018). This behaviour only exacerbates feelings of suspicion and isolation of students and other service users (Qato 2017; Danvers 2021; Spiller et al. 2018), arguably rendering the concept of PREVENT both unactionable and severely detrimental.

3.1.3 Islamophobia

As previously discussed, PREVENT has drawn strong condemnation from a wide range of academics due to its racialised agenda (Danvers 2021; Guest et al. 2020; Saeed and Johnson 2016; Scott-Baumann 2017). PREVENT's racialised agenda disproportionately targets Muslim communities (Danvers 2021). This aspect of PREVENT causes the most harm and thus renders the policy inadequate as a counter-radicalisation method in multi-cultural Britain.

The racialised aspect of PREVENT, fuelled by the moral panic surrounding Islamic fundamentalism (Stevenson 2018; Danvers 2021), has led to "widespread islamophobia" (Taylor 2020:855). The epidemic of Islamophobia currently faced in the UK has surfaced partly due to the "problematic outcomes of failed 'War on Terror'" (Abbas 2019:402). It has led to a racialised policy that is "preoccupied" by those from Muslim backgrounds (Elshimi 2015:121). This racist preoccupation is perhaps best exemplified in the literature by Whitehead (2013), whose study into referrals to Channel (PREVENT) reported that around 70% of the 3000+ referrals were associated with signs of Islamic extremism (Whitehead 2013).

Considering this disproportionate percentage and the implicated institutionalised Islamophobia (Abbas 2019), the following data about stigma and the negative effect on Muslim communities seems inevitable. The literature gathered throughout this review have highlighted the contributions PREVENT has made to the systematic othering of Muslim communities through what is increasingly problematic state-Muslim engagement (Ragazzi 2017; O'Toole et al. 2016; Abbas 2019; Qato 2017). The concern that PREVENT stigmatises Muslim communities is not a new or strictly academic reflection. In 2010, a Government evaluation reported fears that PREVENT initiatives were stigmatising Muslim communities (House of Commons 2010).

Due to the stigmatisation of Muslim communities becoming more mainstream and even institutionalised (Abbas 2019; Taylor 2020; Qato 2017), the consequential effect of causing Muslim communities across the UK severe harm has also radically increased. The effects of policies like PREVENT enabling this destructive relationship are best epitomised by the drastic spike in violence levels against British Muslims after acts of terror are committed worldwide (Abbas 2019; Awan and Zempi 2016; Hanes and Machin 2014).

The harms faced by British Muslims due to the Islamophobia that PREVENT and policies like it encourage are not just physical. The alienation and othering experienced by Muslim communities (Abbas 2019; Ragazzi 2017; Qato 2017) can also be argued to push PREVENT's target communities into spaces where they are more likely to experience cognitive openings (Wiktorowicz 2004). Thus, causing the policy to have the opposite effect to the intended aim of decreasing radicalisation.

3.1.4 Summary

To summarise the findings for this section, PREVENT is considered unsuccessful and severely harmful to the 'vulnerable' communities it aims to aid. The implications of the Prevent duty and the resulting reframing of professional relationships, the drafting of staff into a state of surveillance and the rampant Islamophobia; all-cause the policy to be not only fundamentally ineffectual but also drastically damaging.

3.2 PREVENT's Effect on Pedagogical Staff

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, there has been little research into PREVENT's effects within Education. There has been especially little into the impact on staff within the sector. For any future study to address this, there first needs to be a consolidation of the research to date. This section of the systematic literature review aims to address this need.

The effects of PREVENT on pedagogical staff are vast and far-reaching. To best chart these effects, this section of the chapter has been split into different aggregated themes, ranging from the impact on pedagogical roles through to the effect Islamophobia has on staff.

3.2.1 Redefining and Limiting of Role

One of the primary things that PREVENT redefines or limits within pedagogical roles is the concept of safeguarding. Busher et al. report how "core government messages" (2017:7) surrounding PREVENT being fundamentally about safeguarding lead to "fairly high levels of confidence among school and college staff" (Busher et al. 2017:7). This blurring of lines (Lakhani and James 2021) between safeguarding and counter-radicalisation leads to overreporting (Jerome et al. 2019), with the Prevent duty being framed as the "right" way to conduct safeguarding (Danvers 2021:13).

The pressure of doing the "right thing" (Danvers 2021:13) and the blurred lines surrounding safeguarding (Lakhani and James 2021) has also been found to reduce pedagogical staffs' confidence in using their discretion with the Prevent duty. Anxiety about using the Prevent duty in the 'right' way causes the process to become a tick-box exercise (Vincent 2018; Jerome et al. 2019).

Anxiety within pedagogical staff due to the Prevent duty (Busher et al. 2017) has other effects beyond just their engagement with the scheme. Within the Education sector, the emphasis on PREVENT's importance and the consequential anxiety surrounding it has led to a shift in pedagogical practices (Danvers 2021; Reed 2016; Jerome et al. 2019). This shift

comes in many forms, each having an impact on staff. As a means to respond to the Prevent duty, extra content is added to the curriculum, ensuring the topic of 'Britishness' is covered in a manner that meets PREVENT's demands (Jerome et al. 2019; Busher et al. 2017). To meet these demands, a new emphasis on extra-curricular activities linked to PREVENT has emerged. These changes, alongside the desensitising of the curriculum that is required of pedagogical staff (Danvers 2021), have led to an increasing level of pressure (Busher et al. 2017; Danvers 2021) on an already over-stretched and under-funded sector.

Not only is the educational sector being forced to increase its workload to comply with the narrow ideal of "Britishness" (Jerome et al. 2019:827) that PREVENT presents, but pedagogical staffs' roles are now also (Lakhani and James 2021; McGlynn being fundamentally redefined due to the policy. With the new emphasis being placed on the sector responding to PREVENT and the Prevent duty (Busher et al. 2017) the relationship between pedagogical staff and their students is becoming increasingly securitised (Moffat and Gerard 2020:209). This securitisation moves pedagogical staff into roles of "informants" (O'Donnell 2016:67) in a "modern day McCarthyite regime of spying and scapegoating" (McGovern 2016:59). This "betrayal" (Moffat and Gerard 2020:209) of their students' trust sees pedagogical staff moved from pastoral roles and educators to "spies" (Reed 2016:86). With pedagogical staff now burdened with policing their students and McDaid 2019) and therefore prevented from providing unhindered pastoral care, their previous roles are being eroded.

It is clear that even just in terms of their roles' limits and meaning, pedagogical staff have paid an incredibly high cost for PREVENT. A policy that this review has previously found to be ineffective and unsuitable for purpose.

3.2.2 Infringement of Safe Spaces

The destruction of pedagogical staffs' pastoral roles and, therefore, their ability to educate has ramifications past just the direct impact on the defining aspects of their roles. The enforcement of PREVENT in Education and the consequential shift in pedagogical roles,

directly causes a deterioration of the 'safe space' that needs to be provided for the sector to function effectively.

Turning pedagogical staff into spies (Reed 2016; McGovern 2016) makes it impossible for teachers to both provide this 'safe space' but also to benefit from it (Reed 2016). This is due to the pre-criminal surveillance space (Lundie 2017:7-8; Jerome et al. 2019:832) developing in schools because of the current emphasis on the Prevent duty. This 'pre-criminal space' places severe restrictions on the freedoms of speech and expression (Sjøen and Jore 2019), stemming from fears from pedagogical staff that saying the wrong thing could lead to a referral (Danvers 2021).

Another effect of PREVENT's infringement of Education's 'safe space' is that it stifles honest behaviour due to the "over-governed" surveillance state the sector exists in under PREVENT (McGovern 2016:59). This existence under increased surveillance (Lundie 2017; Jerome et al. 2019; McGovern 2016) prevents open conversation and debate (Reed 2016; Danvers 2021). Consequently, it becomes impossible for extreme views to be challenged in a productive, open way, stopping pedagogical staff from being able to aid in the deterrence of 'cognitive openings' (Wiktorowicz 2004).

3.2.3 Islamophobia

PREVENT's racialised agenda (Danvers 2021; Guest et al. 2020; Saeed and Johnson 2016; Scott-Baumann 2017) leads to a far more stringent approach to enforcing the Prevent duty in relation to Muslim students and pedagogical staff when compared to their non-Muslim counterparts. Awareness amongst staff surrounding the racial disparities in the enforcement of the policy causes the anxieties for those placed into an "informant" role (O'Donnell 2016:67) to be incredibly high (Busher et al. 2017).

Unfortunately, Muslim pedagogical staff members are uniquely positioned in that they are both expected to enforce the Prevent duty and are members of a community disproportionately targeted by it (Moffat and Gerard 2020). Experiencing this causes these

staff members to experience high levels of conflict (Sjøen and Jore 2019). Findings show that pedagogical staff feel like PREVENT requires them to target Muslim staff members and students (Moffat and Gerard 2020; Jerome et al. 2019). When investigating these effects adjacently to each other, it is clear that the impacts of PREVENT on Muslim pedagogical staff are enormous.

Furthermore, the conflict that arises due to the Muslim pedagogical staff's unique position has been shown to cause severe anxieties (Busher et al. 2017; Jerome et al. 2019). As a consequence of these anxieties, a shift in pedagogical practices occurs (Danvers 2021). The primary shift in pedagogical practices is the self-censorship among Muslim staff members (McGovern 2016). The fear of being reported leads to Muslim pedagogical staff avoiding controversial topics. By avoiding these topics, classrooms become depoliticised and desensitised, preventing individuals from having the space to discuss ideas (Danvers 2021; Reed 2016) freely.

The effects of this self-censorship go beyond just causing Muslim staff members to avoid potentially provocative topics. PREVENT hinders pedagogical staff from utilising literature that cites polarising perspectives (Danvers 2021), changes pedagogical decision making (Leathwood and Read 2020) and forces staff members to avoid open debate lest an 'inappropriate' topic is breached (Danvers 2021).

3.2.4 Summary

As shown in the section above, PREVENT's impact on pedagogical staff is impossible to overestimate. The consequence of redefining staff roles and moving them from teacher to 'informant' has catastrophic effects not just on their ability to carry out their role but also on supporting Muslim pedagogical members. The racialised aspect of the policy causes severe anxiety for staff members and, as a direct result of the Prevent duty, the safe spaces that existed within education are quickly eroding.

Although there is not yet enough data within this area of research to fully understand the true depths of the policy's human cost, the Islamophobia, destruction of safe spaces, and

the securitisation of pedagogical relationships have blatant ramifications within the sector. These ramifications support the findings from 3.1 and echo the damaging nature of the policy.

3.3 PREVENT's Effect on Students Across the UK's Education System

Following on from the last section, this penultimate portion of the chapter will explore the research into PREVENT and its effect on students' education sector. Education as a sector is drastically under-researched regarding PREVENT's impacts, and this gap in the literature is highlighted within this latter stage of this review.

Today's students will shape tomorrow's policies, norms, and culture and consequently, the ramifications of a damaging policy aimed at this demographic would be catastrophic. It is therefore imperative that further extensive research is done into the human cost of PREVENT. This research is critical to fill the current gap in the literature and ensure that the impacts on those affected by the policy are reduced or prevented altogether. This next section of this systematic literature review will detail in three thematically aggregated parts PREVENT's impacts on students in the UK to best support any future study.

3.3.1 Islamophobia

Throughout this systematic literature review, one glaring thread holds the three sub-areas of research together, the blatant racial disparities that PREVENT causes and their disproportionate effect on Muslim communities (McGlynn and McDaid 2019; Lakhani and James 2021). These disparities are primarily caused by the earlier iterations of the policy and the remaining legacy of PREVENT's focus on Islamic extremism (Jerome et al. 2019).

The racial disparities enforced through the Prevent duty have driven the policy to become a prevalent form of "anti-Muslim discrimination" (Taylor and Soni 2017:247). The Islamophobic nature of the disparities is perhaps best illustrated by the study completed by Lakhani and James. They found that pedagogical staff were less likely to refer to forms of

radicalisation that were not related to Islam, leaving types such as far-right extremism going under-reported (Lakhani and James 2021). This discriminatory focus, specifically within Education, severely impacts Muslim students, leaving them feeling like others perceive them as a “threat” (Jerome et al 2019:825) instead of the children they are.

The effect of being labelled a "threat", either overtly or covertly through targeted policy action is vast, especially among young people. This labelling leaves Muslim students feeling othered and isolated (Taylor and Soni 2017; Lakhani and James 2021; Kyriacou et al. 2017; Jerome et al. 2019). For Muslim students, this labelling is coupled with overreporting (Kyriacou et al. 2017), and this combination emphasises and exacerbates an 'us vs them dichotomy' (Ali 2014). In forcing Muslim students into a system whereby over-adherence to the Prevent duty creates this dichotomy, PREVENT creates a situation that highlights the exogenous conditions that Wiktorowicz reports as being the first stage of radicalisation (2004). The policy and its alienation of target communities has also been linked to Muslim students feeling 'discouraged' from attending universities (Kyriacou et al. 2017:12).

Furthermore, the dichotomy that PREVENT creates between the Muslim 'them' and the non-Muslim 'us' adds to a climate of fear that has developed due to racial discrimination and further compounds the marginalisation of Muslim students (Taylor and Soni 2017; O'Donnell 2016). The consequential effects of PREVENT and the institutionalised Islamophobia that the Prevent duty entails and epitomises (Kyriacou et al. 2017) is blatantly clear throughout the literature. The aforementioned institutionalised Islamophobia that PREVENT represents leads to the increase in the development of climates where cognitive openings (Wiktorowicz 2004) are more likely to occur.

The counter-productive nature of the Prevent duty and the racist profiling nature of PREVENT only serves to destabilise and destroy the lives of the students that the Educational sector exists to enrich.

3.3.2 Securitised Freedom

PREVENT also drastically affects students' freedoms of speech and expression (Sjøen and Jore 2019; Saeed and Johnson 2016). The enforcement of PREVENT through the Prevent duty securitises the Educational sector (McGovern 2016) due to the shift in roles it causes for pedagogical staff (Busher et al. 2017; Jerome et al. 2019).

This securitisation of educational spaces causes students to feel monitored by pedagogical staff who consequently become labelled as PREVENT's "informants" (O'Donnell 2016:67). The climate of suspicion (Kyriacou et al. 2017) and the feeling of betrayal that then develops prevents students from feeling safe enough to behave "honestly" (McGovern 2016:59). Racial disparities in how the Prevent duty is enforced and the institutionalised Islamophobia that it epitomises exacerbates students' feelings of suspicion and insecurity (McGlynn and McDaid 2019; Kyriacou et al. 2017).

In addition, the "infantilising model of securitised child protection" (McGovern 2016:54) that PREVENT creates, highlighted by the blockage of certain websites, raises concerns about preventing legitimate study (Kyriacou et al. 2017), consequently damaging academic freedom (Lakhani and James 2021). All of the above "silences" students (O'Donnell 2016:58), hindering their freedom of speech and expression (Taylor and Soni 2017).

Due to their redefined role under PREVENT, the lack of trust in pedagogical staff causes students to practice 'self-censorship' (O'Donnell 2016; Sjøen and Jore 2019; Taylor and Soni 2017; Lakhani and James 2021). This lack of trust has a 'chilling effect' (UCU referenced in O'Donnell 2016:62) on important debates that could help address Wiktorowicz's theory of radicalisation (2004).

As a result, the current Education system under PREVENT risks raising a student body that is unable to rationalise and respond to 'exogenous conditions' that cause 'cognitive openings' (Wiktorowicz 2004), leaving them significantly more susceptible to extremist messaging (Sjøen and Jore 2019).

3.3.3 Climate of Distrust

The final effect on students within the UK's Education System that this systematic literature review is going to explore in-depth is the climate of distrust that develops as a result of the Prevent duty.

Pedagogical staff are placed into positions of “thought police” (McGlynn and McDaid 2019:4) and “informant” (O’Donnell 2016:67) by the Prevent duty and the referrals it entails. Thus, causing a drastically damaging development of mistrust towards staff (Lakhani and James 2021; Taylor and Soni 2017), a phenomenon illustrated by referrals being labelled as “betrayals” (Moffat and Gerard 2020:209). This feeling of betrayal significantly undermines the student-teacher relationship (Kyriacou et al. 2017), removing the safe space that the Education system should provide (O’Donnell 2016). Furthermore, the enforced removal of this safe space through the Prevent duty occurs in a way that exists in direct opposition to core academic values (UCU 2015; Jerome et al. 2019).

When combined, the above effects of the Prevent duty form a climate where Education is used as a host system to breed a “culture of control and compliance” (McGovern 2016:50). Students’ awareness of this leads them to find “alternative safe spaces” (Taylor and Soni 2017:249) to discuss and explore ideas. The search for alternative safe spaces leads to the furthered alienation of young people (O’Donnell 2016; Lakhani and James 2021; Jerome et al. 2019; Kyriacou et al. 2017). Hence, it increases their risk of a cognitive opening forming when exposed to exogenous conditions (Wiktorowicz 2004), and then the opening is filled by extremist ideology (Sjøen and Jore 2019).

3.3.4 Summary

Students within the UK's Education system are arguably some of the most affected by PREVENT. The literature explored above has highlighted how the institutionalised Islamophobia and racial discrimination they are subjected to and witness drastically increases students' risk levels.

Furthermore, the destruction of the pedagogical relationship between students and staff members, due to the Prevent duty and the monitoring it entails, has catastrophic effects on students. Their resulting lack of faith in staff causes a loss of trusted pastoral support for vulnerable students. This loss of pastoral care leaves the students who need the most support open to abuse from those willing to exploit possible cognitive openings.

Although there is not yet enough data within this area of research to fully understand the true depths of the policy's human cost, Islamophobia, restrictions of freedoms, and the securitisation of pedagogical relationships have blatant ramifications within the sector, these ramifications support the findings from the rest of the chapter and echo the damaging nature of the policy. Additionally, they are perhaps best illustrated by the findings discussed in this chapter, which show that PREVENT and its duty damage students' life chances, making them less likely to feel comfortable attending university (Kyriacou et al. 2017).

3.4 Discussion and Conclusions

In summary, PREVENT is not successful, taking its counter-productive nature to the point of catastrophic fallout. This systematic literature review has covered various criticisms from a wide range of sources, but several have continued to be highlighted throughout the research.

Considering all of the literature studied, it is clear that the policy has a single point of failure; the Prevent duty. The statutory duty the policy is enforced through is a direct cause of several of PREVENT's most severe implications for communities across the sectors targeted. Through the Prevent duty, the policy negatively reframes professional relationships, damages safe spaces, causes a loss in professional trust, and proliferates a racialised agenda.

PREVENT's statutory duty deputises staff across sectors into a McCarthyite state of surveillance and hinders any application of individual discretion through the undertraining of staff. When this is combined with the ever-expanding nebulous of terms used to describe

those 'at-risk' or 'vulnerable' to radicalisation, the scope for risk assessment becomes infinite. The lack of defined scope leads to staff scrambling to fulfil the impossibly ambiguous duty forced upon them by government, producing a wave of over-reporting that disproportionately affects Muslim communities.

Institutionalised Islamophobia runs through the policy to its core, with the racialised aspect of this over-reporting being symptomatic of this ethical crisis. This disproportionate targeting of Muslim communities is fuelled by the current moral panic surrounding Islamic extremism. The policy forms a symbiotic relationship to this collapse in community by further contributing to the moral panic, causing spikes in anti-Muslim violence, alienating them and making them vulnerable.

The policy further alienates service users from across the sectors through the negative reframing of relationships. Securitising staff through the Prevent duty leads to restricted levels of freedoms for both staff and service users across the sectors. As the points of monitoring increase, the ability for staff and individuals interacting with organisations to express their thoughts openly and honestly is significantly hindered. The hindering of this expression causes a culture of fear to develop, suppressing all opportunities for any potential cognitive openings to be countered, as individuals will perform non-extremism to avoid referrals.

The above conclusions and analyses are emblematic of the struggles currently faced by those in the Education sector due to PREVENT. The impact of the policy on pedagogical staff and students is impossible to overestimate. The consequence of redefining staff roles by moving them from teacher to spy has catastrophic effects not just on staff's ability to carry out their role but also on their ability to support fellow staff members and their students. PREVENT has further ramifications through the sector due to the previously summarised racialised agenda. Within the Education sector, this aspect of the policy causes severe anxiety for staff members and students and, as a direct result of this, the safe spaces that existed within Education are quickly eroding. The destruction of safe spaces within Education due to the breakdown in pedagogical relationships drastically increases the risk of

radicalisation for individuals by leaving them open to abuse from those willing to exploit possible cognitive openings.

Whilst some may argue that the use of the curriculum to combat radicalisation by teaching 'Fundamental British Values' has been effective within the UK, the data gathered within this literature review clearly states otherwise. The alienation of pedagogical staff and students due to the study of these blatantly narrow values cannot be ignored. This clumsy use of the educational sector to target radicalisation is ineffective and counter-productive, leaving vulnerable individuals exposed and pushing those not previously considered 'at-risk' to extremism, thus highlighting the villain-victim dichotomy that policymakers have bred through PREVENT.

The overarching conclusion of this systematic literature review is that the human cost of PREVENT far outweighs any arguable success it may have in preventing radicalisation. The true depths of the policy's human cost, the Islamophobia, restrictions of freedoms and the securitisation of pedagogical relationships have blatant ramifications within Education and beyond. As such, academics and policymakers can no longer allow the continued extinguishing of academic debate and expression in the misguided attempt to combat radicalisation.

CHAPTER 4 – Conclusion

In conclusion, throughout this systematic literature review, the success of the UK's PREVENT policy has been investigated via the interrogation of a vast range of academic material. The issue surrounding the human cost of PREVENT across public sectors was of central importance for the evaluation of the policy. Despite this, there has been little attempt to collate the nebulous of research analysing this aspect of the policy. As such, this review set out to shed clarity on PREVENT's human cost, both overall and within a specific sector that it has drastically reshaped, Education.

The findings of this project revealed an overwhelming consensus among the mass of literature examined, ruling that PREVENT is ineffective at best and a misuse of power at worst. Although this research has demonstrated that the policy was designed to help counter extremist ideology before the point of a cognitive opening, it is clear that the human cost of this clumsy attempt far outweighs any arguable successes. This systematic literature review has found PREVENT to contribute directly to, and in some instances cause, the securitisation of professional relationships and increased restrictions on freedoms.

Within Education, the data gathered over the course of this review highlighted the policy's impact on pedagogical staffs' abilities to fulfil their roles and the severe impacts PREVENT has on Muslim staff in particular. This level of human cost was mirrored in the data collected about PREVENT's impact on students. As the most vulnerable part of the Education system, our students feel the ramifications of PREVENT the most, with the policy causing some to avoid Further Education due to the alienation and racialised agenda PREVENT entails.

The racialised aspect to PREVENT was the key takeaway from the data gathered. PREVENT and the Prevent duty are emblematic of the institutionalised Islamophobia that is currently rife in the UK due to the misguided 'War on Terror' and the accompanying moral panic surrounding Islamic Extremism. This particular human cost has the furthest levels of devastation, with the stigmatisation and discrimination against innocent Muslim staff members and service users (e.g., students within Education) creating a villain-victim dichotomy that proliferates rates of radicalisation.

The findings support the concept that for a counter-radicalisation policy to be most effective, it needs to be a combination of both outreach programmes and policies instead of the current McCarthyite format of PREVENT. As a result, this study confirms earlier work by Jarvis and Lister, who wrote on the link between division and increased vulnerability to radicalisation (2012). Therefore, it can be concluded that PREVENT is fundamentally unfit for purpose due to its exacerbation of racist ideologies and its creation of the conditions that encourage radicalisation.

Whilst this project has endeavoured to reduce bias by gathering as much varied literature as possible, a single researcher has completed the research. This contributes to the bias and subjectivity of the results. Furthermore, as a systematic literature review, this project relies on the literature that currently exists within the field. In the case of this topic, the literature available is skewed in focus due to public focus, mimicking the bias displayed in the policy, concentrating the majority of research on Islamic Extremism.

For this reason, further work is needed to address the human cost of PREVENT and the success of the policy itself. A cohort study using pedagogical staff and students, for the course of students' academic career, to test and analyse the long-term impacts and restrictions on individuals would address the stability of the findings outlined here. Comparative research into the policies in other countries facing similar forms of radicalisation would also be of value when finding best practice. Other areas of interest that this systematic literature review could help future exploration of would be the comparison of age and gender concerning lived experiences under PREVENT, especially within Education.

Finally, given the abhorrent forms that the human cost for PREVENT takes, the evidence from this research suggests that the policy, if not disbanded completely, should be reformed to favour inclusion and trust. A policy that promotes the villainisation of children and other innocent parties in the name of safeguarding 'British values' has no place in a modern democracy.

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Appendices

Appendix A. Documentation of search process

Date of search	Database	Search terms	Results – Total since 2008	Results – First 5 pages	Results – After abstract
29.03.2021	Google Scholar	((radicalisation) OR (prevent)) AND (UK)	2,050,000	50 (28 selected by title)	18
31.03.2021	Jstor	((radicalisation) OR (prevent)) AND (UK)	136,868	120 (41 selected by title)	6
Sub question 1 sub total			2,186,868	170 (69 selected by title)	24
06.04.2021	Google Scholar	((radicalisation) OR (prevent)) AND (UK) AND (education)	919,000	50 (24 selected by title)	9
06.04.2021	Jstor	((radicalisation) OR (prevent)) AND (UK) AND (education)	68,237	120 (16 selected by title)	1
Sub question 2 sub total			987,237	170 (39 selected by title)	10
06.04.2021	Google Scholar	((radicalisation) OR (prevent)) AND (UK) AND (education)	919,000	50 (25 selected by title)	8
06.04.2021	Jstor	((radicalisation) OR (prevent)) AND (UK) AND (education)	68,237	120 (16 selected by title)	0
Sub question 3 sub total			987,237	170 (39 selected by title)	8
Total			4,161,342	510 (147 selected by title)	41

This search process was then supplemented via backreferencing relevant material cited in the literature found throughout the search, in line with Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam's snowballing method (VUA 2021), as detailed in the methodology.